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Understanding the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) is important for
analyzing capital flows and the industrial organization of multinational finns. Most empirical
studies of FDI, however, have focused on case studies of nontax factors in overseas investment
decisions or on discerning reduced-form relationships between some measure of EDT and
variables relating to nontax and tax aspects of the investment decision. In this paper, we examine
the effects of taxation on FIN using previously unexplored (for this purpose) panel data on ELM
by subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms collected by Compustat's geographic segment file
project These firm-level data contain information on new capital investment overseas which
enable us to measure tax influences on EDT more precisely and allow us to focus on structural
models of subsidiaries' investment decisions. Our empirical results cast significant doubt on the
simplest notion that "taxes don't matter" for U.S. firms' EDT decisions. Tax parameters influence
FDI in precisely the ways indicated by neoclassical models. Our results also lend support to the
application of the "tax capitalizatioiC model to the study of dividend repatriation and foreign
direct investment decisions.
Jason 0. Cummins R. (llezm Hubbard
Center for the Social Sciences Graduate School of Business
Columbia University Columbia University
New York, NY 10027 New York, NY 10027
and NBERI. INTRODUCTION
Understanding the determinants of foreign direct investment is important for analyzing
capital flows and the industrial organization of multinational firms. Most empirical studies of
foreign direct investment, however, have focused on case studies of nontax factors in overseas
investment decisions or on discerning reduced-form relationships between some measure of direct
investment and variables relating to nonrax and tax aspects of the investment decision. These
studies (which we review in section 2) have helped to assess the qualitative effects of changes
in underlying determinants on firms' overseas investment activities. It is more difficult, we argue
below, to inferstructurallinks between tax parameters and foreign direct investment in existing
studies. Our interest in investigating those structural links stems both from a desire to extend
models of foreign direct investment and from a concern that policymakers' consideration of using
tax instruments to influence foreign direct investment requires a more formal empirical analysis.
At one level, this task is straightforward. A number of authors have related tax
parameters in "home" (residence) and "host" (source) countries to financial variables such as the
cost of capital or Tobin's q. Given such relationships, one could extend and exploit conventional
neoclassical investment models developed to explain firms' domestic investment decisions to
estimate effects of tax parameters on outbound or inbound foreign direct investment.
In practice, this exercise is not so easy. Studies of effects of tax parameters on (generally
inbound) U.S. foreign direct investment have relied on aggregated (by country) data on
investment flows calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Because these data do not
distinguish between new capital investment and acquisitions of existing assets, it is difficult to
use them in tests of formal models of investment decisions. Given our interest in the effects of
tax policy on foreign direct investment, this definitional problem is a significant one. In
particular, Auerbach and Hassett (1993) have noted that the consequences of neglecting the
different tax treatments of the two forms of U.S. inbound foreign direct investment are
substantial.
In this paper, we examine the effects of taxation on foreign direct investment using
previously unexplored (for this purpose) panel data on outbound foreign direct investment by
subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms collected by Compustat's Geographic Segment file
project. These finn-level data contain information on new capital investment overseas, which2
enable us to measure tax influences on foreign direct investment more precisely and allow us to
focus on structural models of subsidiaries' new investment decisions.The paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing empirical literature on the determinants of foreign
direct investment. Our model of the effect of tax and nontax factors on firms' foreign direct
investment decisions is presented in section 3.Section 4 describes the panel data on
multinational parent firms and their foreign subsidiaries that we use to estimate the model. We
analyze empirical results for U.S. outbound foreign direct investment in section 5, and discuss
in section 6 implications of those results for analyzing the role of tax policy in firms' overseas
investment decisions. Section 7 concludes.
2.EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Existingempirical studies of foreign direct investment (FDI)reflectresearchers' interest
in industrial organization or taxation.' Industrial organization inquiries have generally ignoredtax
considerations and analyzed FDIasbeing governed by finns' desire to exploit the value of
ownership-specific assets (such as valuable intangibles) or location-specific advantages (related
to sourcing or marketing). Empirical research has centered on reduced-form, cross-sectional tests
of FDIina particular sector as a product of proxies for ownership-specific and location-specific
variables (see, e.g.. the studies in Dunning, 1985)? Public finance inquiries have focused on the
role of differential tax treatment as determining the source and location of FDI, holding constant
nontax determinants.3
'An exception is the survey in Caves (1982), which discusses both considerations.
2Two other "industrial organization" approaches have also appeared. Wilson (1993) has used
case studies to examine the roles played by nontax and tax considerations in location decisions.
In a different vein, Fmot and Stein (1991) study the influence of capital-market imperfections
on the source of FDI.
'Theoretical analyses in this vein include Gersovitz (1987) and Alworth (1988). We review
empirical studies below. Foroverviewsofsystemsfor taxing income from foreign direct
investments, see Ault and Bradford (1990), Frisch (1990), Hines and Hubbard (1990), U.S.
Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1990, 1991), and U.S.Departmentof the Treasury
(1993).3
Asignificant body of empirical research by public finance economists has emphasized
effects of taxationon FDIinto the United States. This literature has generally examinedreduced-
formrelationships between capital flows andmeasures of after-tn rates of return or effective tax
rates on capital income.
Several studies have used annual aggregate data for foreign direct investment financed by
subsidiary earnings and parent company transfers of funds, following Hartman's (1981, 1984.
1985)contributions.4 Hartmanused as a theoretical benchmark the "tax capitalization" approach
to analyzing firms' dividend and investment decisions (see the derivation in King. 1977;
Auerbach,1979; andBradford, l981). In that approach, dividend payouts are a residual in firm
decisions.Payout ratiosdonot affect finns'required rateof returnonequity,and permanent
changesinindividual tax ratesdo not affectdividend payouts or the cost of capital. In the
context of FIN, these implications permit Hartman to ignore effects of (at least permanent
changes in) home country tax parameters on FDI in "mature" subsidiaries — i.e., those paying
dividends to their parent finns.6 We return to this issue in section 3.
Hartman (1984) estimated the effects on U.S. inbound FDI of changes in the after-tax
rates of return received by foreign investors in U.S. inbound FDI and by investors in U.S. capital
generally, with the intent of measuring impacts of shifts in returns to new FL)!. He also includes
as an eiplanatory variable the tax rate on U.S.capitalowned by foreigh investors relative to that
NJ
4Hartman used data on FDI for 1965 to 1979, provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis;
the data are separated according to whether investment was financed by subsidiary retained
earnings or transfers from foreign parent companies.
'Sinn (1984) also demonstrated that retentions-finance investments by subsidiaries are
independent of home country tax parameters. The work of Harunan and Sinn built upon the
earlier work by Hoist (1977), who maintained that a subsidiary's cost of capital depended upon
both home and host county tax parameters when profits are remitted.
'Thispredictionismoresuitably applied to firm-level data than to aggregate FL)! data, of
course.The taxcapitalization approach suggests that a mature subsidiary's investment financed
by retained earnings is unaffected by the home county tax rate. Thissuggestionisnot
equivalent toaclaim that aggregate investment out of retained earnings will not be affected by
the home country tax rate.4
owned by U.S.investors? His estimated models do not incorporate measures of either U.S.
withhotdingtaxes, foreign income taxes, or rates of return on non-U.S. investments.
Using the log of the ratioof FDIto U.S.GNP as the dependentvariable,8 Hartman's
results indicate that the FDI-GNP ratio increases as the after-tax rates of return rise and decreases
as the relative tax rate on foreigners rises. The variables have the expected sign, though
explanatory power was much better for investment financed by subsidiary retained earnings.
These suggestive findings indicate that taxes are an important determinant of FDI.
Hartman's study provoked manysubsequentrounds of replication and refinement.
Employing the rate of return series calculated by Feldstein and Jun (1987), Boskin and Gale
(1987) reestimated Hartinan's model using data over the period from 1956 to 1984. While their
results varied across specifications and time periods, they are qualitatively consistent with
Hartman's original findings.
In his dissertation, Newlon (1987) reconsiders and extends the earlier analyses of Hartman
and Boskin and Gale (1987).Aftercorrecting miscalculations in the FDI data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (for years from 1965 through 1973), Newton reestimates the specifications
used by earlier authors and finds that the model relating the log of the FDI-GNP ratio to after-tax
rates of return on transfers of funds fits better, though the model for investment financed by
retained earnings fits more poorly. When Newlon uses data over the 1956-1984 period, his
results depart from those of Hartman and Boskin and Gale. He finds no estimated coefficient
that explains FIN financed by nnsfers of funds statistically significant from zero.
Thesestudiesare important advances on our understanding of the effects of taxation on
FIN. A number ofconcerns arise,however. An obvious one relatestoproblems of inference
1Hartman intends this last variabletoproxy for effectsonasset valuation of taxes applying
only to U.S. investors. (Changes in the valuation of assets affect the cost of investing for
potential foreign investors.)
'Young (1988) relaxes the assumption that the GNP elasticity of U.S. inbound FDI is unity.
With this modification, and using revised data over the 1956-1984 period, he finds a smaller
(though still statistically significant) response of FDI financed by retained earnings to the after-
tax rate of return, confirming Harmian's result Young finds no evidence that taxes affect an FDI
financed by transfers of new funds.5
using reduced-form models and highly aggregated data; we return to this in sections 3 and 4.
A second relatesto theomission of home-country tax rates from the analysis (see, e.g., Slemrod,
1990, discussed below). Third, nontax determinants of FDI are not explicitly modeled. Fourth,
Newlon (1987) and others have noted a problem in interpreting the coefficient on the rate of
return on FDI financed by retained earnings. As long as the home country taxes worldwide
income using a foreign tax credit and deferral, a subsidiary is likely to finance investment first
by using retained earnings. In this case, when the subsidiary's desired investment exceeds its
retained earnings, the subsidiary will retain all of its income; that is. retained earnings and
income will be equal. This could lead to a spurious correlation between investment financed out
of retained earnings and the rate of return (where the numerator of the latter is effectively
retained earnings).9 Finally, the FDI data supplied by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
suffer two drawbacks, even accepting their level of aggregation: (1) as noted in the introduction,
they measure financial flows rather than new capital investment per se;'° and (2) they are based
on periodic benchmark surveys, raising the possibility that EDt flows are more mismeasured the
further is the observation from a benchmark year."
9The problem is even more general; the spurious correlation can arise even in cases where
the subsidiary follows any fixed rule for determining dividend payments out of current earnings.
as noted by Newton (1987).
'°As constructed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, FDI includes purchases of existing
assets by foreign investors, while it excludes investment raised in the host country or in third
countries. The analysis in Auerbach and Bassett (1993) suggests that a significant proportion of
U.S.inboundED! is related to acquisitions.
"Slemrod (1990) attempts to address the concerns about the official ED! data. To adjust for
potential measurement error in FDI on account of the benchmark procedure, he includes in
models of FDI (described below) two dummy variables. The first represents the difference
between the year for which the data arc provided and the year in which the most recent
benchmark survey is conducted. The second relates to the post- 974 period as a proxy for once-
and-for-all modifications of definitions and concepts relating to ED! carried out by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis in 1974.6
Slemrod(1990) addressessome of these concerns, whilestill relying on the data on PD!
providedby the Bureau of Economic Analysis.'2 Hedisaggregates the P1)1 data into the
UnitedStatesbyseven countries -- Canada, France,Italy,Japan, theNetherlands,the United
Kingdom and(the former) West Germany.He also makes three departuresfrom theapproaches
usedby earlier authors. First, he controls for a richerset ofnontax variables, includingtheratio
of U.S. GOP to the combinedGDPofthe seveninvesting countries(to capture impactsof
changingmarketsizes), theprime-age-maleunemploymentrate in the United States and weighted
averageofthe unemploymentratesinthe seven investing countries (tocapture impacts on FDI
ofbusiness cycles), the real effectiveexchangerateof the U.S. dollar against the GDP-weighted
avenge of the currenciesof the seven investingcountries(tocapture impactsof changesin
relative costsof production), andadjustmentstoaddresspotentialmeasurement error in FIN(see
footnote10 above).
Second,he uses measures of effective tax rates on corporate investment in the United
States (calculated by Auerbach and Hines, 1988) instead of after-tax-return measures. Third, he
includes lagged as well as contemporaneous measures of this tax rate concept (appealing to "time
to build" arguments).
Slemrod's principal findings are as follows. Considering the seven countries together he
concludes that: (1) the marginal effective tax rate in the United States has a negative and
statistically significant effect on total FIN and transfers-financed PD!; (2) these estimated impacts
of the marginal effective tax rate axe not robust to the inclusion of the weighted-avenge foreign
unemployment rate (which is itself positively related to FDI into the United States); (3) of the
nontax variables, the relative GDP measure, the U.S. unemployment rate, and the PD!
'2Using aggregate data on FD! over the 1956-1984 period considered by earlier authors,
Slemrod tim reestimates existing models. He then explores effects of pretax rates of return and
tax rates separately. For FIN financed by retained earnings, he finds that the estimated
coefficients on tax terms are insignificantly different from zero; for FDI financed by transfers of
funds, the estimated coefficients on tax terms have the expected sign and are significantly
different from zero. These results are the opposite of those in Ha mtan (1984). When Slemrod
uses the marginal effective corporate tax rate on invesunent calculated by Auerbach and Hines
(1988) (instead of the average tax rate), he finds that the marginal effective tax rate has a
statistically significant effect on transfers-financed FD! but not on retentions-financed PD!.7
measurementadjustment have no statistically significantimpact on FIN;and(4)the real effective
dollar exchange rate hasanegative and statistically significant impact on inbound FDI." When
he grouped the countries into those with worldwide (foreign tax credit) and those with territorial
(exemption) systems. Slemrod's results failed to support predictable differences in the tax
sensitivity of FDI between the two groups.'4
While Slemrod's contribution addresses some of the concerns raised in the empirical
literature, it raises others. For example, there are questions about the merits of Slemrod's
approach to the problem of spurious correlation between retentions-financed FIN and after-tax
rates of return (see Hartman, 1990). Second, as noted earlier, the BEA data do not allow one
to distinguish new investment and acquisitions in FDI. Finally, the approach does not suggest
a structural model, which could be used for policy inference.
In the next section, we develop a simple siructuial model to study new foreign direct
investment by individual finns.Asthe reader will likely note in that section and in the following
section describing the firm-level panel thta we use, our approach also requires many simplifying
assumptions. In our view, however, the application of standard, theoretical investment models
to firms' decisions offers the best hope of assessing effects of home country and host country tax
systems on foreign direct investment.'3
3.MODELING EFFECTS OF TAXES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
3.1 Basic Issues
'3Whilepossibly consistent with the low-relative-production-cost explanation offered by
Slemrod (see also Pugel, 1985). this result is also considered with the capital-market-imperfection
explanation offered by Froot and Stein (1991): A low value of the dollar increases the dollar
value of foreign investors' net worth, enabling them to offer more collateral and obtain more
funds to finance investment in the United States.
'4Such apparent insensitivity could reflect problems in the specification or the tax rate
measure, or, in addition, the use of techniques for intertempotal tax minimization.
t5This exertise is similar in spirit to the swdy of subsidiary dividend repatriation decisions
in Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (1994)-8
Ina world of ideal data, assessing the impact of taxation on finns' foreign direct
investment decisions would be straightforward.t'In the q-theory approach, for example,
investment I of parent firm i in subsidiary j at time I relative to that subsidiary's capital stock
K. under certain conditions,'7 depends linearly on that subsidiary's marginal q, appropriately
adjusted for tax considerations.'3 That is,
= 8y + bq, + £ p
where a and h are parameters to be estimated and z is an expectational ezror.
Homecountryand host country tax parameters have been incorporated in theoretical
definitions ofthesubsidiary's marginal q by Alworth(1988), Altshulerand Fulghieri(1990), Jun
(1990)and others, under different assumptions about the taxing regime, dividend policy, and
foreign tax credit status of the parent (in countries with worldwide tax systems).In this
abstraction, we could estimate a and Li, thereby permitting a calculation of elasticities of
investment demand with respect to various tax parameters influencing multinational Lums'foreign
direct investment decisions. We could also compare the reasonableness of estimates of a and Li
with parameters estimated from firm-level data on domestic investment by similarly situated firms
in home and host countries.
Unfortunately, this ideal is not particularly useful as a practical guide to estimating effects
of taxation on the level of firms' foreign direct investment. First, it is difficult to develop a
1'For the purpose of this analysis, we are ignoring some cost considerations associated with
the choice of capacity.
'7The necessary assumptions include perfect competition, constant returns to scale
technologies, and quadratic adjustment costs; see, e.g., Hayashi (1982) and Summers (1981).
I B There isnothing special about the q formulation of the investment demand equation; one
could use the cost of capital formulation as well (see,e.g., Auerbach and Hassett, 1992).
Altshuler and Fulghieri (1990) iUuslrate the effects of home and host country tax parameters and
the parent's tax status on a subsidiary's cost of capital.9
proxy for marginal q under the best of circumstances.'9 For foreign direct investment, a further
complication arises because location-specific effects on the subsidiary's q cannot be captured by
using available data to construct the parent's q,and valuesof subsidiary-specific q'sarenot
observable.
To reduce these problems, while using the same basic structural strategy as that just
described, we use the Euler equation approach to estimate the responsiveness of investment to
tax parameters (see, e.g., Abel, 1980; and Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992). As we discuss below,
this approach has fewer informational requirements than the conventional q theory representation
used in the empirical investment literature. Nonetheless, it permits estimation of the same
structural parameters in the foregoing example so that we can still ask: Given a change in a tax
parameter, how does a subsidiary's marginal q change, and how does foreign direct investment
change? The approach also pennits consideration of expounded models in which "net worth"
changes can affect foreign direct investment (see, e.g., Gertler and Hubbard, 1988; or Froot and
Stein, 1991).
3.2TheEuler Equation Approach
Analyzing investment demand begins with an expression for the value to the parent i of
the foreign subsidiary j3°Theafter-tax return to the parent firm at time : reflects capital
appreciation and cunent dividends.2' In equilibrium, this return equals the retump
See the discussion in Hayashi (1982) and Hubbard and Kashyap (1992).
20Thederivation herein expands upon Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) and Hubbard, Kashyap,
and Whited (1994).
For simplicity, we consider one majority-owned subsidiary per parent, we are thereby
abstracting from tax-minimizing strategies available to parent firms with multiple subsidiaries.
We are also abstracting from parent investment through third-party conduits located in neither
the parent's country nor the subsidiary's country.10
(l—r,1)EE,(v,.,
— — + (1t5ED,,,1
(1)
vu,
whereV is the value of the subsidiary at time:; S denotes the value of parent equity transfers,
( is the effective tax rate on subsidiary earnings retained and invested abroad; and E,isthe
expectation operator conditional on information known at time:. (The after-tax capital gain to
the parent firm thus consists of the change in the value of the subsidiary less the component of
this change due to parent transfers.) Subsidiary i's dividends to parent iattime :+Jare
and t' is the tax rate on those dividends. This derivation follows the tax capitalization view of
the dividend decision (see the discussion in section 2), in which the required rate of return for
equity investment in the subsidiary is independent of the subsidiary's dividend policy..
In the absence of any bubbles, solving (1) forward yields the following expression for the




The subsidiary maximizes (2) subject to five constraints.
The first is the capital stock accounting identity:
K,,=+ (1-5)K,,,,, (3)
where K,, is the capital stock of subsidiaryj at time t, I, is its investment at time:, and 5 is the
(assumed constant) rate of economic depreciation.
The second constraint defines dividends. Cash inflows include sales,parent equity
transfers, and net borrowing, while cash outflows consist of dividends, variable factor and interest
payments, and investment expenditures:
We are assuming that the parent firm has a controlling interest in the subsidiary.11
=(ltft)[F(Kq,p.1 N& -
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N4,,=a vector of variable factors of production for subsidiary j at time r,
= a vectorof realfactor prices for subsidiary j at time r
B,, = the real value of net debt outstanding for subsidiary j at time r,r
= nominal interest rate paid on subsidiary i's debt at time r,
= expected rate of inflation at time t(in currency in which subsidiary j borrows);
p,,, = subsidiary i's price of capital goods at time :relativeto the price of output at time
= corporate income tax rate in the host country for subsidiary j at time r,
= investment tax credit in the host country applying to subsidiary J at time It,
= present value of one dollar of depreciation allowances in the host country applying
to subsidiary j at time r,
,t'I,) = subsidiary's real net revenue function (FK>O, F<0);
and v(JKu,.,) =real cost of adjusting the capital stock (w.O, '4',,. >0. v<0. WKK <0).





23 This setup implicitly assumes that the subsidiary's debt can be obtained on identical terms
from different sources and that the parent cannot successfully disguise repatriation of profits
interest.12
The fifth constraint is a transversality condition that prevents the firm fmm borrowing an infinite
amountto pay dividends:
lim[fl B7.O,V, (7)
Let Aubethe series of Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraint (5).andlet rn,1
representthe ratio ('-&/('-",,)•Substituting(4) into (2) for Dy,,and using(3) to eliminate 1,,
fromthe problem, the first-order condition for the subsidiary's capital stock (K&canbe
expressedas:
E.D4(mw::t'') (FK,.1) —
+ (1-8)($/I1.1X0..) + ____________
1-k—
'p, (4, Kvri) + '4t-;)
Toobtain an equation for investment, it is necessary to parameterize the adjustment cost
function,(l,,, K13,,).Thetradition in the q-theory literature has been to specify adjustment
costs that are linearly homogenous in investment and capital, so that marginal and average q are
equal(see,1-Iayashi, 1982). A convenient paraiueterization adhering to these constraints is:
tfJ ___ — (9 ""Vt' 21K
tM-II
wherethe bliss point in the adjustment cost function is given by u. By differentiating (9) with
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We assumethatexpectations arerationaland allow for an expectacional error,e+,,where
E,(e1 1+,) = 0 and E, = o.The error is uncorrelated with any information knownat time
t, therebyallowing us to reexpressequation (10) as:








Forthecases mentioned below, we willuse generalizedmethodof moments (GMM) to
test for misspecification of (11). With a set of instrumental variables that are orthogonal to the
error term, the orthogonality conditions should not be rejected for equation (11).
Our su-ategyis asfollows. We estimate the model in (11) using data on FDI in foreign
subsidiariesofU.S. firms (described below), and proceed in two steps, producing0MMestimates
of the underlyingparametersunder alternativeassumptions thattax variables are omitted from
or includedin themodel. Assuming that we have appropriately modeled the subsidiary's
investmentdecision (and chosen appropriateinstrwnental variables),iftax considerations are
important, parameter estimates should be implausible in the "no tax" version, and the
orthogonality conditions should be rejected. On the other hand, we expect more plausible
parameter estimates when tax considerations are properly specified, and the model's orthogonality
conditions should not be rejected. Successful estimation of the model'sparameters then enables
us to return to the q-theomtic experiment suggested in section 3: What is the predicted effect on
outbound EDT of changes in domestic and foreign tax parameters?
33Econometric Estimation14
Two general issues arise in the estimation of equation (11). First, the model is nonlinear
in both the parameters and the ratio of investment to the capital stock. Moreover, there is a
simultaneityproblem because of the presence of the expected marginal product of capital in the
model.These two considerationsarguefor (3MM estimation.
Second, given theindustrial organization considerationsdiscussedin section2,we want
toallow for thepossibility offirm-specificand time-specificeffects. We include year dummies
to deal with the latter. Because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable in equation
(11), the standard practice of accounting for firm-specific effects by removing the means from
the variables in the model will violate the orthogonality conditions used to identify the model.
Instead, we first-difference equation (11) and then use twice-lagged instruments, which will still
be orthogonal to the moving-avenge error that the differencing creates.
4.THE DATA
4.1Panel Data on Foreign Direct Investment
Thedata setis constructed from the Compustat Geographic Segment file. Approximately
6500 companies report information from their foreign operations, segregated by geographic
segment. Both U.S.- and foreign-incorporated firms report sales, operating income, and fixed
assets. Up to four geographic regions are reported for seven years aLa time. We combine two
seven-year panels to obtain a data set extending from 1980 to 1991. There is no requirement by
either the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or the SEC reganling the groupings for
geographic areas. As a result, the degree of specificity between company reports varies. For
example, consider two companies operating in the same countries. Company A might report four
The (3MM technique minimizes a quadratic objective function that has an optimal
weighting matrix based on initial parameter estimates. The model will be overidentified as long
as the number of instrumental variables used exceeds the number of parameters to be estimated.
The test is formulated as follows: Under the null hypothesis of orthogonality of the instruments
and the error terms, the product of the minimized value of the objective function and the number
of observations is distributed as ax2 statistic with n degrees of freedom, where n is the difference
between the numbers of instruments and parameters. The overidentifying restrictions are rejected
if the x value is higher than a critical value.15
different geographicareas: France, Germany,Canada, andAsia. Company B might reporttwo
differentgeographic areas: France and Eumpe, and "other foreign."
The accounting literature stresses that considerable caution should be exercised in making
inferences about data reported for regions and for groups of countries (see, e.g.,Pointerand
Doupnik, 1993). No conclusions about their relative importance can be made from the data.
Consider Company B again. It is not necessarily the case that one can isolate its French
operations since it reports them first and aggregates all its other European operations. In
constructing the panel we avoid this problem by taking the most conservative course. We include
only geographic segments when a single country is reported. While this strategy reduces the
number of observations, it increases data quality and accuracy.
A second pid'all in using Geographic Segment data is that it is sometimes impossible to
obtain data in a manner consistent with official definitions because of a company's method of
reporting. This is, of course, a problem in constructing any firm-level panel data but it deserves
special mention here since companies have more than the usual latitude in what they include in
the data. For example, excise taxes might be included in sales, or intangibles might be included
in fixed assets. We mitigate the problem by isolating discrepancies from data footnotes.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that care is required in constructing variables from these data.
The data are better understood by knowing their genesis. Geographic segment disclosures
are mandated by Statementof FinancialAccounting Standards No.14-FinancialReporting of
Segments in a Business Enterprise (SFAS 14), issued in 1976." SFAS 14 was designed to
provide information useful for evaluating the nature of the firm's investment and production
decisions but to allow discretion in defining reportable segments and in employing coarse
defmitions. SFAS 14 requires firms to disclose information about foreign sales, income, and
fixed assets if foreign operations account for ten percent or more of a firm's revenue or assets.
The directive became effective for companies with fiscal years ending after December 15, 1976.
Two notes should be made about data extending to 1976. Segment data through fiscal years
ending in 1979 contain many classification adjustments consistent with a learning process.
"
See,e.g., the discussions in Senteney and Bazaz (1992) and Pointer and Doupnik (1993).l6
Moreover, there appearsto be little gain from extending samples before 1979 because of the
paucityof data. As a result of these considerations we begin our sample in 1980.
Inadditionto the pitfalls considered above, two more subtle issues arise in using the
geographicsegment data.First,aswenoted intheintroduction, tounderstandproperlytheeffect
of taxes on FDI. thenewinvestment" component must beseparated fromthe"mergersand
acquisitions' component. Thisisa potentially seriousproblem inthesedata,since reporting
requirements are broadanddatadefinitions arecoarse.However, further research on how
companies comply withSFAS 14 in practice revealed that theproblemis not a significant one?'
Whilepractitioners' advice mitigatedour concern,we took two additionalstepsin the data
construction tominimizeanypotential contamination.First,asis typicalinthe investment
literature, we deletedmajorcapital stockchangesto eliminatecleardiscontinuities in theidentity
ofthefirm. Second, the geographic segment file provides a footnote if the data reflect the results
ora merger or acquisition; wedeleted firms recording this footnote.
Asecond potential problem isthat geographicsegment data arereported inU.S.dollars.
Since currencyfluctuations couldmisrepresentthevalue of theforeign subsidiary'sdata it was
necessary to determine when geographic segment data are converted to dollars.Forthe purposes
of SFAS 14 firms typically convert the data when balance sheets are prepared at fiscal year.end.V
4.2 ConstructingVariables tired inthe Estimation
We constructedthe variables used in the econometric estimation as follows. The
subsidiary's sales are defined as reported net sales for that geographic segment. The subsidiary's
cash flow is defined as the sum of its operating profit and, if available, its depreciation; gross
261n private communication, Donald jCjrk, Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board when SFAS 14 was promulgated, explained to us that firms usually will not record the
acquisition of capital through mergers and acquisitions in their geographic segment report.
Debbie Compton, Senior Data Manager at Standard & Poor's Compustat, confirmed that
Compustat geographic segment data typically do not reflect the results of merger and acquisition
activity.
21We thank Donald Kirk for explaining this point to us. Debbie Compton again confirmed
that Compustat believes that the data are converted in this manner.17
investment is the change in the gross stock of tangible fixed assets. Each of the above variables
is divided by the beginning-of-period value of tangible fixed assets. The subsidiary's capital
stock depreciation rate and nominal cost of borrowing is assumed equal to those of its parent
finn, which we calculated elsewhere in Cummins, 1-lassect. and Hubbard (1993). Host country
tax variables (investment tax credit, depreciation allowances, corporate income tax rate, and
withholding tax rate) are taken from Cummins, Harris, and Hassett (1994). A detailed discussion
of their construction is provided therein with accompanying tables. The price of capital goods
is the host country's investment price deflator. All variables are deflated by the host country's
GDP deflator.
Tables 1-4 summarize our data on U.S.finn's outbound FIN; theconstruction of variables
is described therein and below.
The first table indicates the number of U.S. foreign subsidiaries reporting information in
the Compustat data. Countries for which Compustat reports data are Canada, the United
Kingdom, (the former West) Germany, France, Japan, and Australia. Data are available over the
time period from 1980 through 1991. While the number of subsidiaries reporting infonnation
varies from year to year (generally growing over the period), we are able to obtain investment
and operating information on from 282 to 632 U.S. foreign subsidiaries.
Table 2-4 report summary statistics for subsidiary investment, operating income, and sales
respectively. The entries in Table 2 represent the mean value for year: of the ratio of investment
(1,)tobeginning-of-period capital stock (K,.,)?Themeans are calculated using the values of the
subsidiary capital stocks as weights. The "operating income" entries in Table 3 represent the
(capital-stock-weighted) mean values of the ratio of operating income to the beginning-of-period
capital stock for thevariousyears and countries. The"sales"entries inTable4 represent the
2tSince the geographic segment filedataare reported inU.S.dollars, one must confront the
issue of exchange rate shifts in calculating gross investment as the first-difference in the dollar-
valued capital stock. One approach — which is used to generate the estimated results reported
in section 5 -- is to consmrct (JFK)datafrom the dollar-valued capital stock data. Alternatively,
one could convert the capital stock data into year-end foreign-currency equivalents in constructing
(I/K).Aswe describe later in note 35, our empirical results are not sginificantly affected by this
change. Neither approach is precisely correct, since, in principle, investment should be valued
in foreign-currency terms as it is made ova the year.18
(capital-stock-weighted) mean values of the ratio of sales to the beginning-of-period capital stock
for the various years and countries.
We used three alternative approachestoconstructing j. First, we assumed that J3= 0.95 -
- that is, an implicit real after-tax annual required rate of return of 5.3 percent. (Setting 13 equal
to 0.90 or 0.99 did not significantly affect our results.) Second, we used data on firms' interest
rates, aggregate surveys of expected inflation, and corporate tax rates to construct data on 13.
Finally, we treated (3 as a parameter to be estimated.
Since the data we use contain no information about subsidiary dividend repatriations, we
beginbyassuming that subsidiaries are repatriating dividends, so that ) = 0. We also examine
separately a subset of subsidiaries in the data over the entire period (as a proxy for "mature"
subsidiaries, for which our '2 = 0" assumption may be more innocuous).
Finally, to construct in, we use values for the tax on cuirent repatriations Ed implied by
the tax prices of repatriations summarized in Table 5 (see also Altshulcr and Newton, l993)?
The value of t depends upon whether the U.S. parent is in an excess limit or excess credit
position. Parents in an excess limit position owe U.S. corporate tax if the U.S. corporate tax rate
exceeds the applicable foreign tax rate. Parents in an excess credit position owe no U.S.
corporate tax. Since we do not have access to the parents' U.S. income tax returns, we cannot
describe precisely whether the foreign tax credit limitation is binding; Instead, we assume that
firms with avenge foreign tax rates above the U.S. corporate tax ntc have excess foreign tax
credits; ru-ms with avenge foreign tax rates less than or equal to the U.S. corporate tax rate are
2'In principle, this measure should reflect the expected taxprice, since, in particular, parent
firms may expect to transit between excess limit and excess credit status in the nextperiod.
(Evidence on the empirical significance of such transitions is presented in Altshuler, Newton, and
Randolph, 1994). With data on parent firms' stocks of foreign tax credits, we could attempt to
approximate the likelihood of a transition between credit states, with attendant effects on the tax
pnce of repatriations. Lacking parent tax return data, we were unable to do this, however.19
assumed to be in excess limit position.3° We assume that the accrual equivalent tax rate on
(overseas) reinvested earnings, 1', is constant over time, allowing us to focus on changes in
S.ESTIMATION RESULTS
Ourestimatesof the adjustmentcostparameter aand the tests ofthemodel's
overidentifying resthctions arereported in Table 6. Four sets of results are reported in the table,
according towhether the homecountry and host country tax parameters are includedinthe model
inequation (11) andaccording towhether weholdf3constant("fixedp") or use data to construct
3("variable l")•Inall cases, the model is estimatedusingthe panel data on investment byU.S.
subsidiariesin Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, and Japan described
earlier.'2 The instrumental variables used are defined in the table.
The first row reports the results under the assumption that "taxes don't matter" -- i.e., all
of the home-country and host-country tax parameters are set equal to zero?' The estimated
values of a of 0.42 (fixed case) and 0.25 (variable case) are not statistically different from
'°I'hisassumption is quite imperfectin practice, as shown in the comparison with tax data
in Altshuler and Newlon(1993).
3twealsoestimated the model assumingthat(=t'12,and obtained results similar to those
reported below.
The results presented in Table 6 are robust to dividing the sample into Canadian and non-
Canadian subsamples.
33Thistestanalyzes whether host-country-cost-of-capital terms (i.e., (1 -- t1 z,)/(l -
and "international tax" parameters (i.e., m,,,÷,/mL) jointlymatter. When we setm131+,/m equal
to unity--in order to examine consequences of ignoring only the "international tax" parameters -
- theestimatedvalueof the adjustment costparameter a is1.88 (with a standardenor of0.70 1),
and the p-value forthetestof overidentifyingrestrictions is 0.222. Given thatour calculations
of inare necessarily approximations (since,without access totax data, weareunable to verify
theforeigntaxcreditstatus ofparent firms),we are notsignificantlyconcernedbyour failure
to reject themodel'soveridentifying restrictionsinthisexperiment.20
zero, implyingimplausiblysmallcostsof adjusting the capital stock. Moreover, the model's
overidentifying restrictionsarerejectedatless than the 1 percent level?'
The second row reports the results whenthetax parameters are included in the estimation
equation. In contrast to the results just discussed, the estimated values of a are now 2.01 (fixed
J3 case) and 1.86 (variable [3case), and axe statistically significant from zero. The point estimates
are qualitatively similar to those reported in studies using Euler equation models to study U.S.
investment (see, e.g., Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992; and Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited, 1994)
and to those reported by Cummins, Harris, and Hassett (1994) for domestic investment in a set
of European countries. Also in contrast to the "taxes don't matter" case, the complete model's
overidentifying restrictions are not rejected. We interpret the striking improvement in estimating
the model as evidence of the importance of tax considerations in U.S.firms'outbound FDI
decisions. Estimation of j3 and a in the tax model (using the same set of instruments) produces
a point estimate of 13 of 0.699, with a standard error of 0.212, and a point estimate of a of 1.97.
with a standard error of 0.568. The significance level for the test of overidentifying restrictions
is 0.390.
Table 7 reproduces the results presented in Table 6 for the subsample of subsidiaries in
the sample for all years. The estimated value of a are similar to those reported for comparable
cases for the full sample in Table 6; the standard errors are larger owing to the much smaller
sample of subsidiaries. Estimation of [3 and a in the tax model (using the same set of
instruments) produces a point estimate of [3 of 0.665, with a standard error of 0.250, and a point
of a of 1.56, with a standard error of 0.753. The significance level for the test of overidentifying
restrictions is 0.120. Hence, our results are supportive of the basic model derived in section 3Y
30ne must exercise some caution in relying solely on Hansen's (1982) i-test to judge the
adequacy of the Euler equation representation of the investment problem. Newey (1985), Ohysels
and Hall (1990), and Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel (1993) have offered other diagnostic tests.
These alternatives have generally addressed the issue of structural stability of coefficient
estimates in time-series models. Applying these tests in the panel-data context is a topic on
which we are currently working in this research program.
Following up on note 28. we also estimated the model converting the capital stock data into
foreign-currency equivalents to construct (i/K). In this case (using the "fixed [3" assumption in
the "taxes included" case), the estimated value of the adjustment- cost paramenter a is 1.62 (with21
6.DISCUSSION
The estimationresults presented in section 5 offer two implications for analysis of tax
policybeyondsimple conclusion that firms take tax incentivesintoaccount in the way suggested
bystandard economic theory in making their investments. The first implication relates to the
usefulness ofmodels suchas equation(11)inmeasuringeffects of home andhost country tax
changes on firms' foreign direct investment The second addressesthedebate over whether the
U.S. system of taxing corporate foreign-source income satisfies capital-export neutrality or
capital-import neutrality.
6.1 Measuring Tax Effects on Foreign Direct investineru
Using the assumptions about adjustment costs associated with new investment employed
in deriving (11), we can return to the initial experiment posed in section2:How do changes in
tax parameters affect foreign direct investment through their impact on the tax-adjusted q
associatedwiththat investment? While we cannot observe the marginal q's to estimate this
effect directly, we can infer the coefficient on marginal q (in a regression of (1/K) on q) from the
results summarized in Table 6. In particular, the coefficient on marginal q in such a regression
can beinterpreted asthe reciprocaloftheadjustmentcost parameter a; the pointestimatefor a
of about 2 implies a "q coefficient" of about 0.5. That is, an increase in a subsidiary's q of 0.10
wouldincreasethe contemporaneous(foreigndirect)investment-capitalratioby 0.05, a
significanteffect given the mean values for the investment-capital ratio summarizedinTable 2.
Tax-induced changes in the subsidiary's q reflect changes in host country tax rates and
investment incentives and home country tax parameterstothe extent that the subsidiary is
expected to change its dividend-paying status or the parent's foreign tax credit position (i.e.,
excess credit or excess limit) is expected to change. The marginal q for new investment by a
a standard errorof0.640), andthep-value for the test of overidentifying restrictions in 0.5 16.22
'mature" (dividend-paying) subsidiary of a parent in a stationary foreign tax credit position will
not be affectedbypermanent changes in home country tax parameters?6
6.2 Assessing Capital-Export-Neutral and Capital-import-Neutral Features of the U.S.System
The failure to reject the investment model derived under the assumptions of the tax
capitalization analysis of subsidiaries' dividend policy suggests that we can use that analysis to
study effects of home and host country tax parameters on the cost of capital for foreign direct
investment?In that regard, we can offer some observations for equity-financed investments
in mature subsidiaries. First, if the home country tax system is based on the residence principle
with a foreign tax credit subject to a limitation and deferral of tax on earnings retained overseas
(as is the case for the United States), the home country tax on repatriations has no effect on
subsidiaries' investments financed out of retained earnings, as long as the parent's foreign tax
credit position does not change." This relationship corresponds to capital-import neutrality for
"This is not strictly true if the definition of taxable income differs across countries or if the
home country tax authority can tax pure profits earned abroad through effective policing of
royalty payments and transfer pricing arrangements (see Hines, 1992; and Leechor and Mintz,
1993).
"For analysis of the implications of the tax capitalization approach for subsidiaries' dividend
repatriations, see Hines and Hubbard (1990), Altshuler and Newlon (1993), and Altshuler,
Newlon, and Randolph (1994). Since Altshuler, Newton, and Randolph used panel data from tax
returns they were able to test for differences in the responsiveness of repatriations to temporary
and permanent changes in the home country tax price on repatriations. They find that dividend
repatriations are significantly more responsive to temporary tax price changes than to permanent
tax price changes, a result consistent with Flartman's application of the tax capitalization
approach.
'ITo see this, note that the cost of capital PW( - 9 for a marginal investment by parent I
in mature subsidiary j at time tsolves:




investmentsby mature subsidiaries of U.S.parentfirms. In its most basic form, this result was
first noted by 1-lanman (1981, 1984, 1985); Altshuler and Fulghieri (1990) generalized it to
incorporate the possibility of changes over time in parents' foreign tax credit positions. Second,
the capital-import neutrality implication does not carry over to the case of expected changes in
the foreign tax credit status. If, on the one hand, the parent firm expected to make a once-and-
for-all transition fmm an excess limit status to an excess credit status, the subsidiary's cost of
capital rises or falls relative to the stationary credit case acconling to whether tc; or
respectively?9 If, on the other band, the parent firm is expected to make a once-and-for-all
transitionfrom an excesscredit status to an excess limit status, the cost of capital (ignoring
withholding taxes) isindependentof host country tax parameters, a capital-export-neutrality
resutt.Hence,theU.S.residence-basedtax systemwith aforeign tax credit is capital-export
Undertheassumption used in section 5 that (is expected to be constant, if the homeandhost
counuytax rates and theparent's foreigntax credit position do not change, m,j, = mq,+,. and the
cost of capital is independent of the home country tax rate.
'To see this, note that the cost of capital (under the assumptionsdescribed in footnote 38)
is given by:
(ltjpp (1_9I[(:* )} -1 'i.t.t
= (1_tfIr(itzs)pI -i
Hence,if tn, the cost of capital falls relative to the stationary credit case; if t>%, the cost
of capital rises relative to the stationary credit case. For example, given the increase in the
likelihood of parents' moving from an excess limit position to an excess credit position after the
cut in t3 in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, U.S. foreign direct invesiment would be expected to
increase in high-tax counties and decrease in low-tax counthes, ceseris paribus.
40To see this, note that the cost of capital (under the assumptions described in footnote 38)
is given by:24
neutral in those examples only in a very limited case -- for mature subsidiaries that pay no
withholding taxes on dividend repatriations and whose parent firms are in an excess limit position
in the period in which an investment is made and in an excess credit position thereafter.
We can present similar examples (again assuming all equity finance) for 'immature'
subsidiaries, those financing initial investment using parent equity transfers. If the subsidiary
eventually repatriates dividends, its cost of capital depends in part on the parent's expected future
foreign tax credit status when the repatriation occurs, if the parent is in an excess credit position
at that time, the home country tax rate does not affect investment, a capital-import-neutral result.
If the parent is in an excess limit position at that time, the cost of capital will depend upon both
home and host country tax parameters.
While these examples are only illustrative (see also the more detailed cases considered
by Altshuler and Fulghieri,1990) they suggestthe potential usefulness of using firm-level panel
data to test the appropriateness of the tax capitalization approaches predictions about the
responsiveness of subsidiary dividend and investment decisions to tax changes.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper represents a first step in a research program to use micro data on multinational
firms' overseas investment decisions to study the determinants of foreign direct investment,
especially those related to tax policy. In that sense, our exercise is in the spirit of attempts to
use micro data to test models of the effects of tax parameters on subsidiaries' dividend
repatriation decisions. The panel data that we use on foreign direct investment of subsidiaries
of U.S. firms permit us to focus on "new investment," a focus not possible with the more
commonly studied aggregate data. These data also allow us to test structural models of
investment decisions, thereby giving us potentially informative estimates of effects of tax
parameters on foreign direct investment.
Put = (l_tu'[(i'1)t]
—1,
whichis independent of the host country tax rate.25
We believe we have been successful in two respects.First, we have extended
conventional investment models to accommodate a wide range of tax influences on foreign direct
investment decisions. Second, our empirical results cast significant doubt on the simplest notion
that 'taxes don't matter" for U.S. firms' foreign direct investment decisions. Tax parameters
influence foreign direct investment in precisely the ways indicated by neoclassical models. Our
results also lend support to the application of the tax capitalization model to the study of dividend
repatriation and foreign direct investment decisions.
Much work remains, however. First, because of data limitations, we were forced to make
a number of simplifying assumptions in estimating our model. In future work, we plan to test
the sensitivity of our findings to plausible alternative assumptions. Second, we are working to
extend our analysis to study effects of tax policy on U.S.inboundforeign direct investment.
Third, we plait to test whether shifts in the host-country-currency value of firms' investments
affect their foreign direct investment holding constant other determinants of foreign direct
investment. Finally, we would like to incorporate imperfect competition and intangible assets
in our approach.26
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YearCanada U.K. Germany France Japan Australia Total
1980 225 25 12 3 4 13 282
1981 224 36 12 4 5 12 293
1982 242 45 11 5 7 14 324
1983 254 54 10 5 10 13 346
1984 272 58 13 8 15 14 378
1985 307 81 16 10 19 18 451
1986 320 94 19 11 23 24 491
1987 346 105 22 11 26 23 533
1988 362 104 21 11 24 24 546
1989 394 113 20 11 25 28 589
1990 403 121 32 15 29 32 632
1991 366 [19 29 17 25 28 582
So.rre,Authon calculasion..Table 2: Mean I/K1_1 of U.S. Foreign Subsidiaries
Year CanadaU.K.Germany France JapanAustraliaTotal
1981 .142 .124 .018 .072 .093 .152 .136
1982 .071 .101 .021 .339 .046 .128 .080
1983 .108 .077 .019 .013 .220 .211 .110
1984 .069 .120 .016 .306 .163 .056 .017
1985 .122 .327 .309 .213 .224 .321 .170
1986 .125 .248 .320 .283 .412 .066 .179
1987 .181 .351 .451 .497 .344 .296 .253
1988 .202 .193 .149 .082 .270 .318 .208
1989 .145 .135 .135 .222 .136 .201 .146
1990 .117 .195 .195 .215 .222 .138 .168
1991 .084 .130 .138 .138 .249 .109 .119
5mg.: Author. calculasion..
.Voi.:li is sro.. invetmcns.Table 3:MeanCasht/Kt_iof U.S. Foreign Subeidiax4es
Year Canada U.K. Germany France Japan Australia Total
1981 .L41 .029 .032 .012 .120 .199 .123
1982 .122 .098 .125 .021 .022 .188 .118
1983 .127 .105 .064 .086 .087 .115 .119
1984 .133 .143 .044 .454 .128 .055 .131
1985 .130 .018 .078 .463 .370 .124 .134
1986 .131 .125 .255 .102 .092 .030 .128
1987 .169 .131 .152 .113 .167 .450 .170
1988 .168 .157 .014 .270 .364 .134 .171
1989 .107 .096 .041. .110 .246 .133 .112
1990 .102 .109 .092 .355 .276 .091 .111
1991 .073 .087 .063 .431 .221 .053 .091
Soarer: Authors calculations.
No go: CsI,,isthe suni of open.ting profit and. ifsysilible.depitcision.Table 4: Mean SuIe31/K_I of U.S. Foreign Subsidiaries
Year Canada U.K. Germany France Japan Australia Total
1981 1.55 1.37 1.40 1.50 .808 1.23 1.51
1982 1.29 1.52 1.42 1.33 1.59 1.54 1.34
1983 1.44 1.48 1.49 .476 1.63 1.30 1.43
1984 1.49 1.38 1.61 1.15 1.96 1.08 1.47
1985 1.46 1.46 1.82 2.03 2.19 1.12 1.50
1986 1.57 1.71 2.09 1.47 1.97 1.27 1.62
1987 1.60 1.50 1.69 1.29 1.85 .935 1.57
1988 1.55 1.33 1.43 1.882.07 1.38 1.53
1989 1.46 1.62 1.96 1.69 1.68 1.31 1.52
1990 L.38 1.71 1.76 2.03 1.72 .992 1.47
1991 1.36 1.44 1.23 1.80 1.80 .948 1.37
Sorter Authon calaibsiona.
Vole:Sale., is net sales.TABLE 5
TAXRATEON REPATRIATIONS OF OVERSEAS EARNINGS
FROM U.S. FOREIGN DIRE INVESTMENT,?
Tax Systems C'
ClassicalSystem
Excess limit parent (t5-t,)/(1-r)
Excess credit parent w,
Split-rate system
Excess limit parent (t-t)(I-t) +-
+ d (; - Q (I-'r,)/U-'r,)2
Excess credit parent -+ Wi
Imputationsystem
Excess limit parent (J+a1) ((tus4i)/(I-traA/btus.))/(1 .1)2]-a,
Excess credit parent (l+a,) n, -
Notes:t= U.S.corporate tax race
=corporatetax rate in host country J
w=withholdingtax raze in host country j
= dividend payout ratefor subsidiary in host country j
= taxrate on undisuibuted profits in host country j
= taxrate on distributed profits in host country j
a1=taxcredit given for advanced corporation tax in host country j
tForthe purpose of this grouping, Canada has a classical system, because benefits of corporate
tax integration are not extended to controlling U.S. shareholders. The United Kingdom, under
its imputation system, provides a partial credit to controlling U.S. shareholders for payment of
its advanced corporation sax. The German corporate tax system is a mixture of imputation and
split-rate systems. Germany does not grant an imputation credit to U.S. shareholders, so we treat
the German system as a split rate system in constructing the tax price of individual repatriations.
Under France's imputation credit system, the imputation credit (avoir fiscal) is not refundable
to controlling U.S. shareholders. Japan had a split-rate tax system until 1989, at which time it
switched to a classical system. In its imputation system, Australia does not impose a withholding
tax on dividends that have borne the (statutory) Australian corporate tax. For a summary of the
corporate tax systems in the countries in our sample, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992,




fixed O variable a fixed fivariable a
No-Tax Model.422 .254 24.36 32.63
(.395) (.406) (.004) (.001)
Tax Model 2.01 1.86 10.23 10.61
(.612) (.628) (.332) (.303)
The fixed B is set equal to 0.95; the variableis defined in the text. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are computed from a heteroscedastic-consistent matrix. Sig-
nificance levels of Hansen's test of overidentifying restrictions are in parentheses
beneath the statistic.
The sample contains 1047 firms. The number of parent firms which report for one
subsidiary is 186; which report for two subsidiaries is 109; which report for three
subsidiaries is 13; and a single parent reports for four subsidiaries.
The instrument set used for estimate above is: (f), (fr)1_4 (k)_. (f)_3,
(fr)_. (fr)_5' (sales/K) 12. (cashf Iow/K)t_2, (k + rz)g_2, (k + rr)_,. The
instruments (f),, and (f)_2 are excluded from the set because both were found
to be correlated with the error term. Estimates are robust to the exclusion of lags
ofand (f) dated before t —3 and to the exclusion of (cash flow/K)g_2. Esti-
mates are robust to the inclusion of further lags of those instruments dated I — 2.
Estimation of B and a in the tax model using the instrument set above produced a
point estimate on fi of 0.699 with standard error 0.212 and on a of 1.97 with stan-
dud error 0.568. The significance level for the tat of overidentifying restrictions
was 0.390. Estimation of the no tax model (with variable fi) using an instrument
set without tax terms produced a point estimate on a of 0.155 with standard error
of 0.496. The significance level for the test of overidentifying restrictions was 0.002.Table 7: FDI Euler Equation Models (Balanced Panel Sample)
Adjustment CostTest of Overidentifying
Parameter Restrictions
a
fixedI variable /3fixed /3variable j3
No-TaxModel .339 .253 12.08 12.48
(.401) (.338) (.209) (.188)
TaxModel 1.49 1.31 9.40 9.97
(.611) (.598) (.405) (.353)
The fixed 3 is set equal to 0.95; the variable /3 is defined in the text. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are computed from a heteroecedastie-consistent matrix. Sig-
nificance levels of Hansen's test of overidentifying restrictions are in parentheses
beneath the statistic.
The sample contains 103 firms. The number of parent firms which report for one
subsidiary is 93; and which report for two subsidiaries is 5.
The instrument set for the tax model is the same as for the full sample. Estimates
are robust to the exclusion of lags of 4. and (fr)3 dated before S — 3 and to the
exclusionof (cash/iow/JC)i...i. Estimates are robust to the inclusion of further lags
of those instruments dated I — 2.
Estimation of 3 arid a in the tax model using the instrument set above produced a
point estimate on B of 0.665 with standard error 0.250 and on a of 1.56 with stan-
dard error 0.753. The significance level for the test of overidentifying restrictions
was 0.120.